Career Paths in Hierarchies: Theory and Evidence from Chinese Officials

Thispaperstudiesthedynamicpatternsofjobdurationsinahierarchicalgovernment.UsingalargedatasetofChineseofficialsfrom1994to2017,wefindsystematicevidencethatthepromotionratesofofficialsatdifferentlevelsofgovernmentarenegatively correlated,contrarytothecommonfindingoffasttrackintheliterature.Tocharacterizethecareerpathsinhierarchies,wedevelopadynamicmodelofoptimaljobassignmentswithsymmetriclearning.ThemodelhighlightstheroleofseniorityincopingwiththeType-IIerror,thatis,theriskofover-evaluatinganofficial’sability.Onlyverycapable officialsarespared,andthefasttrackapplies;relativelycapableofficialsaresubjecttotheover-evaluationrisk,andtheirjobdurationsarenegativelycorrelatedacrosslevelsofgovernment.Anegativecorrelationisalsomorelikelytohappenwhenthecontrollerismoreriskaverse,whichmayexplainmixedfindingsintheliterature.
Keywords:careerpaths,fasttrack,seniority,meritocracyJELCodes:M51,D8,H70